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INS v. CHADHA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO
The law is administered by able and experienced men, who
know too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism....
[OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (1881)]'
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of govern-
ment, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution.
[CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN BURGER (1983)]'
Holmes's view that policy, not logic, shapes the law is particularly
apt for constitutional law. There are some who deplore that judges base
constitutional decisions on their personal views of good policy,' but
hardly anyone denies that judges are in fact guided by "sense" as well
as "syllogism." Judicial policymaking remains controversial in many
areas of constitutional law, but in some it has long since been widely
accepted that judgment as well as reason should influence judicial
decisions. Historically cases involving the separation of powers have
been in this category.
The main line of the tradition, dominant at least since McCulloch v.
Maryland,4 is that practical effects, not abstract formulas alone, should
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guide the Court in separation of powers cases. This is not to say, of
course, that "syllogism" counts for naught; to go that far would be to
repudiate the core of constitutionalism. Instead, an unresolved tension
between sense and syllogism has sustained constitutional jurisprudence
in separation of powers cases at least since Holmes.
The conflict between instrumentalism and interpretivism-between
policy and text-is, of course, not limited to separation of powers cases.
Tension between these competing approaches to interpreting the
Constitution underlies most areas of law. But in separation of powers
cases, where few deny that both sense and syllogism must have weight,
the conflict often breaks out into the open. Speaking for a unanimous
Supreme Court in upholding the Iranian hostage release agreements,
Justice Rehnquist wrote:'
[I]t is doubtless both futile and perhaps dangerous to find any
epigrammatical explanation of how this country has been
governed.... [W]e freely confess that we are obviously deciding
only one more episode in the never-ending tension between ... a
world that presents each day some new challenge ... and the
Constitution ... which no one disputes embodies some sort of
system of checks and balances.
In this area, the Court has sought to maintain a balance between
generalizations and practical accommodations. Thus, Chief Justice
Burger's formalistic opinion for the Court in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha6 came as a shock. In Chadba, the
Court held unconstitutional the legislative veto in §244(c)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act,' which authorized either House of
Congress to disapprove by resolution the Attorney General's decision
to suspend deportation of an alien. For years, distinguished legal
scholars as well as officials of the Department of Justice have
questioned the constitutionality of the legislative veto,' arguing that it
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2976-78 (1981).
6 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
'8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(2) (1976). "Legislative veto" herein refers to a statutory provision by which
Congress has reserved to itself, or to one of its houses or committees, the power to override
actions by officials of the Executive branch or of independent agencies.
' The list of scholars who have testified in congressional hearings that the legislative veto is
probably unconstitutional is a virtual Who's Who of American constitutional law, and includes
Charles Black, Alexander M. Bickel, Philip B. Kurland, and Laurence Tribe. Statements by
scholars and officials of the Department of Justice questioning the constitutionality of the
legislative veto are collected in McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COL L. REV. 1119, 1136-45 (1977); BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE
POWERS 9-13, 43-46 (1977).
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infringes on the President's veto power, and in the case of the
one-house veto, that it violates the principle of bicameralism as well.
What was astonishing about Chadha was not the result, but the scope
and inflexibility of the Court's opinion."
Justice White, who alone dissented from the merits of the Court's
separation of powers analysis,'" proclaimed Chadha to be of "surpassing
importance" because it "sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative
veto'. . .. Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions
in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively
invalidated in its history."" Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment
on the "narrower ground"'" that the legislative veto in this particular
case infringed on judicial power, seconded Justice White's assessment:
"The Court's decision ... apparently will invalidate every use of the
legislative veto.""
Dissenting opinions are a notoriously inaccurate source of insight
into the implications of Supreme Court decisions, but in this instance,
the predictions were quickly confirmed. Only days after Chadha, the
Court affirmed summarily two decisions declaring legislative vetoes
unconstitutional in circumstances arguably distinguishable from
Chadha." Again Justice White dissented, protesting that "[w]here the
Cf. Tribe, note 4 supra, at 162-63: "There is some appeal in the argument that any
congressional veto of an executive or administrative act taken pursuant to a prior delegation must
constitute either a usurpation of the judicial function of interpreting the scope of the original
delegation, or a change in that delegation's initial scope. If it is the former, the legislative veto
impermissibly interferes with the judicial power; if it is the latter, the legislative veto is
tantamount to a new law and must therefore be passed by both Houses and submitted to the
President for his approval or veto. But the difficulty with any such syllogistic approach is that it
appears to exalt rigid formulas in an area where doctrine must be responsive to basic problems of
political accountability and due process rather than to any mechanistic separation of functions
[emphasis added]." See also McGowan, note 8 supra, at 1152: "[C]onventional legal analysis alone
is unlikely to establish definitively the constitutionality vel non of the one-house veto or similar
legislative control devices. In the final accounting, one's position is likely to depend much more
on a subjective assessment of how our constitutional system will best function than on close
textual analysis of constitutional language .... "
" Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice White joined,
questioning the Court's determination that the legislative veto was severable. 103 S. Ct. at
2816-17.
"Id. at 2792, 2810-11.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2789.
"Id. at 2788.
" Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983),
affirming Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United
States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), affirming Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC,
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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[legislative] veto is placed as a check upon the actions of the
independent regulatory agencies, the Article I analysis relied upon in
Chadha has a particularly hollow ring."'5 The Court, however, refused
to hear argument in the cases, or even to remand them to the lower
courts for reconsideration in the light of Chadha. It appeared, for the
moment at least, that the Court had definitively disposed of the
legislative veto in Chadha. The popular press concurred."
Something even more fundamental than the ruling on the legislative
veto was at issue in Chadha. According to the Court, the case turned
on the plain wording of "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the
Constitution [which] prescribe and define the respective functions of
the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process."' 7 Justice
White denounced the majority's approach, however, as "reflect[ing] a
profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held by
the Courts which sanctioned the modern administrative state."'8 To the
majority, on the other hand, Justice White seemed to be offering a
mere "utilitarian argument" that the legislative veto is a "useful
'political invention',".'9 an argument which the Court dismissed as
raising policy considerations not rising to the level of constitutional
significance. Thus, the difference between Justice White and the
majority goes deeper than disagreement over the legislative veto. It
goes to the very nature of the Constitution and to how judges are to go
about relating it to the rapidly evolving structure of the "modern
administrative state."
I
A. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jagdish Rai Chadha came to the United States from Kenya on a
British passport in 1966. After his student visa expired, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began deportation
proceedings. Chadha conceded that he had overstayed his visa and
applied for suspension of deportation on grounds of extreme hardship.'"
" Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. at 3558.
" E.g., Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 7-2, Restricts Congress's Right to Overrule Actions by
Executive Branch, NEw YORK TIMES, June 24, 1983, at 1, col. 6; An Epic Court Decision, TE.
July 4, 1983, at 12.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
" Id. at 2810.
" Id. at 2781.
" Under §244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General "may, in
his discretion" suspend deportation and grant permanent resident status to an alien who has been
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An INS immigration judge ruled in June 1974 that Chadha's request
for a suspension of deportation should be granted, in part because he
had been born of Indian parents and "it would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for [Chadha] to return to Kenya or go to Great
Britain by reason of his racial derivation.""
The suspension of deportation was duly reported to Congress as
required by statute," and on December 16, 1975, the House of
Representatives, without debate or recorded vote, adopted a resolution
disapproving the suspension of deportation in the cases of Chadha and
five other aliens. The chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, who sponsored the
resolution of disapproval, stated that after reviewing 340 cases in which
suspension of deportation had been granted by the INS, the
subcommittee had concluded that in six of them the statutory criteria
had not been met, "particularly as it relates to hardship.""3 Under the
terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act, if either house of
Congress passes a resolution "stating in substance that it does not favor
the suspension of ... deportation, the Attorney General shall
thereupon deport such alien. .,, .2" Thus, the House resolution had the
effect of overruling the INS's order suspending Chadha's deportation
and reasserting the INS's statutory duty to deport him.
Chadha filed a petition for judicial review of the INS proceedings,
arguing, among other things, that the legislative veto of the Attorney
General's suspension of deportation was unconstitutional, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed.
Although the INS had supported Chadha's position in the court of
appeals that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, it filed an appeal
to the Supreme Court, and the House and Senate both filed petitions
for certiorari.
The constitutionality of the legislative veto had been challenged
before, but the Supreme Court had always declined to reach the
constitutional issues.25 In Chadha, however, the Court brushed aside
in the United States for seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would "in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship" to the alien or other persons
including "a spouse." 8 U.S.C. §1254(a)(1) (1976).
634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980), affirmed, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(1) (1976).
"103 S. Ct. at 2771.
§244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(2) (1976).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 n.176 (1976); cf. id., 257, 284-86 (White, J., concurring);
see also Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), affd sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977).
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several threshold issues that offered promising opportunities for
avoiding the merits."' The Court's handling of two threshold issues
was particularly curious. First, 'he Court held that the INS was an
"aggrieved party" entitled to appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1252 (1976),
although in the court of appeals the INS had supported Chadha's
position that the legislative veto was unconstitutional."
The Court's rejection of a second threshold argument was even
more dubious. In 1980, Chadha married a United States citizen, and
thus became eligible to apply for permanent resident status as an
immediate relative of a United States citizen.28 Congress suggested that
the Supreme Court should decline to reach the merits of Chadha's
constitutional claims since other, narrower avenues of relief were now
available. 9 The Court brushed this point aside with the curt rejoinder
that whether Chadha would prevail if he pursued alternative avenues
of relief was "speculative.""0 But in other contexts which do not
involve constitutional issues, and where the grounds for judicial
restraint are therefore less weighty, the Court routinely requires the
exhaustion of administrative remedies even though it is not certain that
the claimant will prevail.' It is hard to understand why the Court
should rule on a major constitutional issue if routine statutory grounds
for granting relief could make the constitutional ruling unnecessary.
Chadha's marriage to a citizen also provided a second reason for
declining to reach the merits, which the Court apparently overlooked.
The stated explanation for the House's exercise of its veto was that
there had been an insufficient showing of hardship in Chadha's case.
Hardship "to a spouse" is an additional statutory ground for granting
suspension of deportation. If the Court had remanded to the INS for
reconsideration, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the INS could
have found additional new grounds for suspending Chadha's
deportation based on the hardship to his spouse. It is doubtful that the
House would have exercised its legislative veto over a new suspension
of deportation based on hardship to Chadha's spouse, since this ground
is far less innovative and controversial than the racial discrimination
rationale originally relied on by the INS.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2772-80.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
' See 8 U.S.C. §§1255(a) and 1203(a)(2) (1976).
' Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
" 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
"See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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The Court in Chadha was not compelled to decide the constitutional
issues, but had to overcome formidable obstacles to reach them. The
fact that several other cases challenging legislative vetoes were already
on the Court's docket may explain why the Court chose to face the
constitutional issues squarely in Chadha," but it does not excuse the
Court's action in reaching out to decide important questions of
constitutional law unnecessarily. The function of the case or
controversy requirement in disciplining the Court's view of the law
might have been better served had the Court waited for another
case.
B. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative veto in Chadha turns
on relatively narrow constitutional issues. The Constitution contains
three "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions"" governing lawmaking
by Congress. Before a bill becomes a law, it must be "presented" to
give the President an opportunity to exercise his veto. 4 This
presentment requirement applies not only to "Bills," but also to
"[e/very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary."" In addition,
the Constitution vests the legislative power of the United States in a
bicameral legislature composed of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. 6 Before a bill becomes a law, it must be passed by
both houses of Congress. The central question presented in Chadha
was whether the procedural requirements for passing laws-
presentment and bicameral action-also apply to the legislative
veto."
" Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), app. docketed sub nom.
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 51 U.S.L.W. 3002 (April 29,1982)
(Nos. 81-2008 etc.), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (en banc), app. docketed sub nom. U.S. Senate v. FTC, 51 U.S.L.W. 3470 (Dec. 12,
1982) (Nos. 82-935 etc.), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); see also Martin, The Legislative Veto and
the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 294 n.105 (1982).
* 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
* "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; .. ." Art. I, sec. 7,
cl. 2.
" Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 3.
Art. I, sec. 1.
"See Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, REGULATION 19, 20
(Nov./Dec. 1979): "The validity of the legislative veto, then, turns quite simply upon whether
it in reality constitutes lawmaking" which must comply with the requirements of presentment
and bicameralism. It has been suggested that the legislative veto may also violate a more general
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Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Cbadha, which was
joined by five other Justices, gives three reasons for concluding that the
legislative veto is legislative action of the kind to which the
Constitution's presentment and bicameralism requirements apply.
None of the three is ultimately persuasive.
1. Presumption. The Court begins with the proposition that the
Constitution divides the powers of the federal government into "three
defined categories, legislative, executive and judicial.""8 While
conceding that they are not "'hermetically' sealed from one another,""
the Court contends that the powers of each branch are "functionally
identifiable" and that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively
exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it. See Hampton
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)."' 0
The Court's reasoning is unpersuasive for several reasons. In the
first place, the Court is mistaken when it asserts that the framers
"defined" the categories legislative, executive, and judicial in the
Constitution. Not only is the Court incorrect-the Constitution does
not define these terms-but the slip is revealing. The Court's
conceptualistic approach to analyzing the issues conflicts with the
more pragmatic approach which the framers actually espoused. In
Federalist No. 37, for instance, Madison warns that any attempt to
define the categories legislative, executive, and judicial in abstract,
theoretical terms is bound to fail.4 ' The most that can be said is that the
Constitution uses the terms "legislative," "executive," and "judicial,"
but that rather than attempt to define these concepts in the abstract, the
framers left to subsequent history the working out of the relationships
among them.
Nor is the Court's conceptualistic approach to the issues in Chadba
supported by the case which it cites, Hampton & Co. v. United States.
Hampton is a 1928 decision in which the Court upheld a statute giving
constitutional "separation of powers principle." Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, supra, 673
F.2d at 470-77 (Wilkey,J.). The Supreme Court specifically declined to rest its analysis in Chada
on separation of powers principles as "an abstract generalization," but focused instead on specific
provisions of the Constitution. 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
' Id. at 2784.
"Ibid.
Ibid.
"Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able
to discriminate and define with sufficient certainty its three great provinces-the legislative,
executive and judiciary; or even the privileges and provinces of the different legislative branches.
Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science." Federalist No. 37 (Madison),
in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Fairfield ed. 1961).
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the President power to modify tariffs against a claim that it constituted
an impermissible delegation of legislative powers to the Executive.42 If
anything, the result in Hampton contradicts the Court's claim that the
powers of each branch are "functionally identifiable." Nor is there any
discussion of "presumptions" in Hampton, the proposition for which
the Court ostensibly cites it. In dictum, Chief Justice Taft does say that
it would be "a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress
gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President."'" On a
superficial, linguistic level, then, the case might be read to support the
proposition that when Congress acts it must be exercising "legislative"
power. It is one thing, however, to deploy a presumption of regularity
to conclude that when Congress acts it is within the scope of
authorized legislative powers, but quite another to rely on presumption
to support the conclusion that a branch has acted in an unconstitutional
manner.*
Even on its own terms, however, the Court's presumption sweeps
in too much and proves too little. Conceding that the legislative veto
is an exercise of Article I legislative power (as opposed to executive or
judicial powers) does not resolve, but only poses the question before
the Court. The Constitution does not require presentment to the
President of all congressional actions within Article I legislative
power. On the contrary, the text restricts presentment to "Bills" and
to "Every Order, Resolution or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ..... The most
that can be said about the drafting history is that the Constitutional
Convention wanted the presentment requirement to apply to bills and
to functional equivalents of bills." Not every exercise of Article I
legislative power comes within these categories, as the Court
concedes. Congress has developed extensive powers to oversee the
Executive's administration of the laws, for example, as an exercise of
276 U.S. at 404.
"Id. at 406.
"See also 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring: "The Court's presumption provides
a useful starting point, but does not conclude the inquiry.")
" Madison wanted to eliminate the possibility that bills could avoid the President's veto by
being passed under a different label, 103 S. Ct. at 2782; id. at 2799-2800 (White, J., dissenting);
S ELLIOTS DEBATES 431 (1845) ("if the negative of the President was confined to bills, it would
be evaded by acts under the form and name of resolutions, votes &c."). See Martin, note 32 supra,
at 295.
' See 103 S. Ct. at 2784. But cf. ibid.: "It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative
action in Art. I, §§1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure."
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Article I legislative powers,'7 but no one would suggest that these
forms of legislative oversight by congressional committees require
presentment to the President for his veto.
The question to be decided in Chadha was not whether the
legislative veto is an exercise of Article I legislative power, but whether
it is an exercise of Article I legislative power of the kind that requires
presentment and bicameral action.4" The Court's presumption that the
legislative veto is an exercise of Article I legislative power should only
frame, rather than decide, the issue.
2. Altering legal rights. The Court does not rely on presumption
alone. It goes on to argue that the House resolution vetoing the
suspension of Chadha's deportation was "essentially legislative in
purpose and effect."' The Court's formalistic approach to the issues is
disappointing, but given its source, not surprising. The Court bases its
analysis on a nineteenth-century congressional report which construed
the Presentment Clause as applicable to any matter which is
"legislative in its character and effect."'" The core of the Court's
reasoning is conceptual and formalistic: the legislative veto is
"legislative" because it has the effect of "altering legal rights." 1
The legislative veto "alters legal rights," however, only because the
Court chooses to characterize its effect that way. The Court's
" McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 111 (1959). For a general description of the panoply of oversight techniques available
to Congress, see generally KiRST, GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PASSING LAWS (1969); SENATE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION, I[:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES (Comm. Print 1977).
, See Scalia, note 37 supra. The narrow textual issue is whether the legislative veto is a
resolution "to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary .... Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 3. It is hard to question that a two-house veto comes under this
language. By definition, a two-house veto is a vote to which the concurrence of both houses is
required. Therefore, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a two-house veto not presented to the
President is clearly unconstitutional. A one-house veto, however, like that at issue in Chadba, is
a different matter. In the case of the one-house veto, a statute authorizes one house to act through
a resolution to which the concurrence of both houses is not literally "necessary." Antonin Scalia
points out that for this reason, at least on a superficial level, the one-house veto stands on a
stronger constitutional footing than a legislative veto under a statute which explicitly requires the
concurrence of both houses. Scalia contends, however, that this argument is "obviously wrong
because it assumes that the Founding Fathers were careful to preserve the presidential veto as a
check upon disguised legislative action by both houses of Congress, but were quite willing to let
a single house proceed unchecked." Scalia, note 37 supra, at 22. In addition, Scalia also argues that
a legislative veto requires bicameral action. With due respect, Scalia's analysis, like the Court's
in Cbadba, is circular. It implicitly assumes that the legislative veto, like passage of a statute, is
the sort of legislative action that requires the "check" of a presidential veto and bicameral
adoption.
9 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897), quoted, 103 S. Ct. at 2784. See also Martin,
note 32 supra, at 296 n.107.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
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manipulation of legal categories could just as easily be turned to
support the opposite conclusion that the legislative veto does not alter
legal rights. 2
The Court maintains that the legislative "purpose and effect" of the
legislative veto is clear because:"
The House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering
the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the
Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all
outside the legislative branch.... The one-House veto operated in
this case to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's
deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the
United States.
The first thing to notice about the quoted passage is that the first and
the last sentences are not equivalent. There is no question that "absent
House action, Chadha would remain in the United States." But does
that really prove that the House resolution had "the effect of altering
... legal rights"? Not at all, any more than when a prosecutor drops
charges for possession of marijuana the defendant thereby acquires the
"legal right" to smoke the substance. Admittedly, prior to the House
resolution Chadha was in the country legally as a result of the
Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation as a matter of
grace. But that does not necessarily support the conclusion that Chadha
had a legal right to remain that could only be altered by statute.
Even if it could be said that Chadha had acquired "legal rights," how
were those rights "altered" by the House resolution? After all, the
statute authorizing the Attorney General to suspend deportation on
grounds of hardship also provided that either house of Congress could
veto the Attorney General's action. Why was the nature of Chadha's
legal rights not defined by the statute creating them? 4 If Chadha's only
right was what the statute gave him-the right to remain in the country
unless one house exercised its legislative veto-then the House's action
did not alter Chadha's rights: the possibility of a legislative veto was
built into them in the first place.
These questions imply, not that the Court's analysis is incorrect, but
that it is arbitrary. The legislative veto "alters legal rights" only
because the Court superimposes that conceptualization on the House
resolution canceling the suspension of deportation. It would be equally
See text infra at notes 56-61.
"103 S. Ct. at 2784-85.
' Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974).
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plausible (and equally arbitrary) to manipulate the Court's abstract
legal categories to say that the legislative veto did not alter legal
rights."
Justice White makes precisely that argument in dissent when he
describes the legislative veto as authority that Congress had
"reserved"5" in the statute. He goes on to argue from this premise that
the legislative veto does not work a "change in the legal status quo,""
and hence that the Constitution's procedural requirements for passing
statutes do not apply to the legislative veto. The only case to have
squarely upheld the legislative veto, the Court of Claims decision in
Atkins v. United States," rested on a similar analysis." A distinction
could be drawn between the Atkins statute and the Chadha statute. The
difference is between a statute which casts the legislative veto as a
condition precedent (executive action only goes into effect if Congress
does not veto it) as opposed to a statute which makes the legislative
veto a condition subsequent (executive action is effective immediately
but Congress may nullify it).' In a footnote, however, the Supreme
" The ease with which the "altering legal rights" test may he manipulated is illustrated by
events during the Carter Administration. Attorney General Griffin Bell had given an opinion
that the one-house legislative veto was constitutional in legislation authorizing the President to
reorganize government departments. Letter from Griffin B. Bell to President Carter (Jan. 31,
1977), reprinted in Providing Reorganization Authority to the President: Hearings Before the
Legislation and National Security Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1977). A few months later, Assistant Attorney General (now Judge)
Wald attacked a different proposal for a legislative veto as unconstitutional, distinguishing it as
a situation in which one House could "effect [sic] the implementation of a substantive statute
which determines the rights of those subject to it." Letter from Patricia M. Wald to Rep. Peter
W. Rodino Jr., 6 (May 5, 1977), quoted McGowan, note 8 supra, at 1141.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2804.
" Id. at 2806.
" 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (plurality opinion).
' In Atkins, the Court of Claims held that a one-house veto of a Presidential recommendation
to increase judicial salaries did not alter existing legal rights but merely cancelled an expectancy.
The veto is "certainly not making new law.., but only preserves the legal status quo." 556 F.2d
at 1063. The Court went on to acknowledge that the President's "recommendations" would have
"become the law" if there had been no legislative veto, but maintained that it was significant that
"the Act did not make them law automatically, but only gave them that effect absent objection
from either House of Congress." Ibid.
' The Salary Act, upheld in Atkins, was construed to contemplate a "recommendation" which
would only go into effect if it were not vetoed, whereas the portions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act struck down in Chadha authorized a "suspension" of deportation which was
effective until vetoed. Perhaps the legislative veto in §244 of the Immigration Act would have
passed constitutional muster had it been written in terms of an Attorney General's
"recommendation for a suspension of deportation" which would become effective if not vetoed
by Congress. Cf. Lewis, Legislative Veto Case Leaves Much Unsettled, NEW YORK TIMES, July
3, 1983, at E5 (reporting vote by the House to require Consumer Product Safety Commission
rules to be adopted by Joint Resolution of both houses and signed by the President before taking
effect). Perhaps it would even be enough if Congress amended the statute to state explicitly that
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Court in Chadha appears to reject outright the Court of Claims'
analysis in Atkins:'
Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto
provision in §244(c) (2) either removes or modifies the bicamer-
alism and presentation requirements for the enactment of future
legislation affecting aliens. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d
1028, 1063-64 (Ct. Cl. 1977). cert. denied, 431 U.S. 1009 (1978); Brief
for the United States House of Representatives 40. The explicit
prescription for legislative action contained in Article I cannot be
amended by legislation.
The Court's answer in Chadha is, of course, no answer at all. The
Court merely asserts the unimpeachable (but irrelevant) proposition
that a statute cannot alter the constitutional procedure for passing
legislation. But the Court's argument assumes that legislation is
necessary, whereas the issue under discussion is whether there was any
alteration of existing legal rights so as to make legislation necessary.
The point in Atkins is logically prior to the question of how legislation
must be passed under the Constitution; it was that legislation was not
necessary since there were no "rights" to alter.
The Court's opinion in Chadha does not turn solely on the Court's
construction of Chadha's rights, however. The opinion can also be
read to hold that the legislative veto is unconstitutional if it alters legal
rights of any persons "including the Attorney General, Executive
Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch." 2 The
Court's reasoning is no less arbitrary and formalistic in discussing the
"rights" of the Executive branch. The Court declares:3
Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation.., no less than Congress' original choice to delegate to
the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves
determination of policy that Congress can implement only one way;
bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.
Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that
delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.
it conferred no legal rights until after the time for Congress to exercise its legislative veto had
passed.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2787, n.22.
103 S. Ct. at 2784 (emphasis added). The Attorney General of the United States has adopted
the broad reading of Chadha, see William French Smith, Congress: No Loss in Ruling by Court,
NEW YORKTwIFsJuly 12, 1983, at A21. (Any congressional action "with the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights of people outside the legislative branch" must be enacted by both
houses and presented to the President.)
" 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
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The first sentence merely restates the Court's conclusion in different
words. The question was whether Congress could affect policy
through the legislative veto without passing a statute. It is no answer
to say that the legislative veto affects policy, and therefore a statute is
required.
As for the second proposition-that Congress must "abide" its
delegation of authority to the Attorney General-one can only ask
"Why?" Again, the question is whether the legislative veto is a
permissible technique for controlling exercises of delegated authority.
Not a word of the Court's opinion is spent explaining why it would
be contrary to the framers' principles of constitutional design or
otherwise legally suspect for Congress to retain supervision over
exercises of power that it has delegated.'
The absence of any other explanation suggests that the Court
regards its conclusion as implicit in the very concept of delegation:
once power has been delegated, it is beyond recall. But there is nothing
inherently implausible about some powers being delegated while
others are retained.
There may be sound reasons of constitutional significance to
prohibit Congress from making partial delegations of power to the
Executive, but the Court does not reach that level of analysis. Instead,
the opinion rests on two legal fictions," "altering legal rights" and
"delegation." The Court treats these abstractions as if they had
independent and immutable existences, rather than recognizing them
as constructs that serve purposes which should define their reach and
measure." This approach to deciding cases by manipulating formal
legal concepts is a throwback to what Llewellyn called the Formal
Style of conceptualistic judicial reasoning prevalent late in the
nineteenth century."
' The Court's opinion does include a short discussion of "the purposes underlying the
Presentment Clauses ... and the bicameral requirement." See 103 S. Ct. at 2781-84. After the
obligatory bow to the records of the Constitutional Convention and THE FEDERALIST, however,
the framers' purposes never figure in the Court's analysis of the issues, see also 103 S. Ct. at 2799
(White, J., dissenting: "I do not dispute the Court's truismatic [sic] exposition of these
clauses").
" Cf. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 20-41 (Firth ed. 1963). The modern connotations of the term
"fictions" should not mislead us to think that the concept applies only if judges are consciously
dissembling. See id. at 29.
"Cf. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,462 (1899) ("different
rights.., stand on different grounds of policy.... [I]f you simply say all rights shall he [absolute],
that is only a pontifical or imperial way of forbidding discussion ...").
" See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5-6 (1960).
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3. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Decision by presumption and
legal fiction would be bad enough, but the Court makes a third
argument even weaker and more palpably unreasonable than the first
two: "Finally, we see that when the Framers intended to authorize
either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed
bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the
procedure for such action."'
The Court proceeds to list "four provisions in the Constitution,
explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the
unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto,"' and to
concede in a footnote that in 1798 the Supreme Court created a fifth
exception by holding that proposed constitutional amendments are not
subject to the President's veto."0 From the existence of these exceptions,
the Court concludes:" "Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer
special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of
the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms."
Here the Court is engaged in another example of the style of
reasoning based on mechanical legal "rules" fashionable in the late
nineteenth century. The principle of construction which the Court
invokes was once in common use for construing contracts and deeds
to land under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. ' While the
maxim is occasionally still cited in cases today to buttress interpreta-
tions of contracts and certain types of statutes," it is quite a different
matter juristically to rely on expressio unius to interpret the
Constitution. The Constitution is not a mere private contract." The
103 S. Ct. at 2786.
Ibid. The exceptions are: the House's power to initiate impeachments, Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 6; the
Senate's power to try impeachments, Art. I, sec. 3, cl. 5; the Senate's power to approve
Presidential appointments, Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2; and the Senate's power to ratify treaties, Art. II,
sec. 2, cl. 2.
* 103 S. Ct. at 2786 n.20, citing Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798).
" 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
* ("The expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.") See BROOM, A SELE'GTION OF
LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED 505 (2d ed. 1848); see also Walla Walla v. Walla
Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 22 (1898). It should be noted that Broom warned that "great caution
[is] always requisite" in applying this maxim. BROOM, at 506.
"See, e.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). On other occasions, however, the Supreme Court has cautioned against
using this ancient maxim to construe modern statutes. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
" "A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles, and
creating national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract." The
Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 439 (1884).
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Constitution was intended to set in motion a process of government
that would adapt to changing conditions over generations, and
consequently linguistic aids to ascertaining the intent of "the
Draftsmen" should carry relatively little weight in interpreting the
Constitution.
Moreover, even in its native sphere of private law, expressio unius is
subject to significant qualifications, one of which should preclude
using it here. Expressio unius is actually a principle of evidence, not
substantive law: If a writing lists some members of a class specifically,
a permissive inference may be drawn that other members of the same
class were meant to be excluded or else it would have been natural to
list them also." The inference is only a weak one, however, and it is
negated entirely if other circumstances show that the list of specifics
was not intended to be exhaustive. In particular, if there is general
language in addition to the enumeration of specifics, the inference
suggested by expressio unius does not apply since the inclusion of the
general language contradicts the premise that the drafters intended to
include everything in the enumeration."
The Court's use of expressio unius in Chadha ignores this
well-established limitation on the principle. Clearly the Constitution
does not purport to specify all the ways in which Congress may
exercise power, and hence the inference suggested by expressio unius
is not applicable. Perhaps the strongest reason to conclude that the
framers did not intend to include everything in the enumeration of
specifics is the fact that, in John Marshall's phrase, "it is a Constitution
we are expounding."" If the government established by the
Constitution is to sustain itself, Congress, like the other branches, must
be able to exercise not only those powers that are mentioned
specifically in the text of the Constitution but also those that may be
fairly implied from the overall structure that the Constitution
establishes.
In the past, the Court has frequently recognized that the wording of
the Constitution does not purport to enumerate Congress's powers
exhaustively. Thus, even though neither power is mentioned
specifically in the text of the Constitution, it has been held that
Congress may approve amendments to the Constitution without
" See 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: §552 at 203-06 (1960).
" Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206 (1928); Corbin, note 75 supra, §552 at
206.
" McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. at 407 (1819).
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presenting them to the President for veto, and that Congress may
investigate and engage in other oversight activities without bicameral
action or presentment." Admittedly, neither of these recognized
exceptions to the requirements of presentment and bicameral action is
directly analogous to the legislative veto, but they do illustrate that
there is a category of congressional powers not mentioned in the text
in addition to the power to pass statutes. Hence it is clear that the text
does not enumerate Congress's powers exhaustively, and that the
Court's reliance on expressio unius is invalid.
The doctrine that powers may be implied as well as enumerated is
so fundamental that it is probably inherent in the nature of any
constitution, but in the case of our Constitution the doctrine of implied
powers is also codified in the Necessary and Proper Clause.79 The
Necessary and Proper Clause is clear, textual evidence that the framers
did not intend to enumerate every way in which Congress may
exercise power, and hence its existence undermines the premise for
invoking expressio unius for the same reasons that general language in
a contract shows that a listing of specifics was not intended to be
exhaustive.
The Court, however, dismisses the Necessary and Proper Clause
with the statement that "what is challenged here is whether Congress
has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing" its
authority rather than Congress's authority to regulate immigration vel
non.' The Court is surely correct that Congress's power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause is not limitless,"' but the Court's analysis
overlooks a crucial logical distinction. The Necessary and Proper
Clause would not immunize an exercise of power by Congress that was
otherwise impermissible under the Constitution, but that is not the
situation before the Court. On the contrary, the point is that the
existence of the Necessary and Proper Clause undermines one of the
premises for the Court's conclusion that the legislative veto is
unconstitutional, not that the Necessary and Proper Clause redeems a
practice which is unconstitutional for independent reasons.
A more sophisticated argument could be made against using the
Necessary and Proper Clause to refute the Court's expressio unius
rationale. It could be argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause is
McGrain v. Daugherty, note 47 supra; see generally KIRST, note 47 supra.
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
'0 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
"Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 132; Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign
and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 483 (1976).
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irrelevant because it only relates to the subjects on which Congress
may "make laws," but it does not affect the procedures for making
them.82 But this argument is also wide of the mark. Congress did "make
laws" in accordance with the constitutional requirements of bicameral
action and presentment when it passed the statutes creating legislative
vetoes. As long as Congress's claim to a legislative veto is grounded on
a statute, duly passed following constitutional procedures, the proper
question is whether such a statute is within the range of subjects on
which Congress is empowered to legislate. Any confusion on this
point arises from the Court's insistence on framing the issue as whether
"the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act"
without following proper procedures for legislating," when in fact
Congress has legislated in accordance with constitutional procedures
when it passed the legislative veto statutes. The proper question should
be whether legislative veto statutes are within the range of subjects on
which the Constitution authorizes Congress to legislate. The
Necessary and Proper Clause is surely germane to that inquiry.
In analyzing whether the Constitution gives Congress power to
enact legislative veto statutes, it must be borne in mind that Congress's
power to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not
restricted to effectuating Congress's own enumerated powers. In
addition, Congress may also legislate in aid of "all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."' Consequently, the Chadha Court's
conclusion that delegated lawmaking authority is an executive, not a
legislative, function 5 actually supports Congress's authority to pass
legislative veto statutes. Congress may base its legislation in an area on
powers conferred by the Constitution on other branches of
government. For example, Congress's power to modify maritime law
is based on the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts, not
on any legislative power independently granted to Congress itself by
the text of the Constitution.' If the authority to make "quasi-
legislative" rules can be delegated to the Executive branch and
"' See 634 F.2d at 433.
'" 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
" Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18. See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers
of the President and the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (Spring 1976).
s, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1; Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
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independent agencies, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress
a general power to "make laws" controlling the exercise of that
authority.
This is not to say, of course, that the legislative veto is constitutional.
Prohibitions elsewhere in the Constitution might preclude the
legislative veto even though Congress has general authority to legislate
to control delegated lawmaking by the Executive. But the Court never
reaches that level of analysis, nor does it identify either the source or
the nature of such prohibitions. Rather, the thrust of the Court's
expressio unius analysis is that Congress lacks power to create
legislative vetoes because the legislative veto is not mentioned
anywhere in the Constitution. That argument is clearly invalid. At
least since McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been clear that powers are not
necessarily denied to Congress merely because they are not
enumerated specifically in the text.
It is hard to imagine why the Court deviates from a principle of our
constitutional law as fundamental as the doctrine of implied powers in
analyzing the legislative veto, but perhaps the explanation lies in the
term "legislative veto" itself. The name associated with a legal device
can carry subtle but powerful implications for the ways that we think
about it.8 The text of the Constitution gives a veto over legislation to
the President explicitly, but it makes no mention of any similar "veto"
for the Congress. By calling the device at issue in Chadha a "legislative
veto," we may unconsciously consign it to constitutionally suspect
territory. The word itself creates a vague, unreasoning sense that if the
framers had intended Congress to have a veto, they would have said so,
just as they did for the President.
But the analogy buried inside the term legislative "veto" is an
imperfect one. Unlike the President's veto, most legislative "vetoes" do
not create a check on a power that the Constitution confides in another
branch; instead, the legislative "veto" usually checks only powers of
delegated lawmaking that are themselves conferred by statute. There
is nothing anomalous about using statutory sources to create a
limitation on a power which is itself statutory in origin. Yet the
associations of the term "veto" imply the opposite: To be valid a "veto"
" The term "legislative veto" was used first in Millett & Rogers, The Legislative Veto and the
Reorganization Act of 1939, 1 PUB. AD. REV. 176 (1941); see Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and
the Constitution: A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351, 351 n.3 (1978).
"As Humpty Dumpty said (anticipating Wittgenstein), words sometimes become our masters,
rather than we theirs, see CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 269 (Gardner ed. 1960).
Art. I, sec. 7.
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must find its source in the Constitution, which creates the presidential
"veto." One cannot know, of course, but the ultimate source for the
Court's curious expressio unius rationale may be a misnomer buried so
deep in conventional legal terminology that we are no longer attuned
to its implications. Imagine that from the beginning the legal device at
issue in Chadba had been called "the conditional delegation" rather
than the legislative veto. Its constitutional pedigree might well be
beyond question by now.
C. THE COURT'S DUBIOUS JURISPRUDENTIAL PREMISES
The legislative veto may well be unconstitutional. Many thoughtful
people have concluded that it is, at least in some circumstances. But if
the legislative veto is unconstitutional, it is not unconstitutional for the
reasons stated in Cbadba. Whatever one's view about the merits, the
Chadha opinion is a disappointment.
The Court's analysis in Chadha is unpersuasive but also fails to come
to grips with important issues raised by the legislative veto. Even an
"apostle of strict construction" was taken aback by the literalism of the
Court's opinion, writing that the Chief Justice "gave us strict
construction with a vengeance. ' Representative Elliott Levitas, a
leading congressional supporter of the legislative veto, ventured a less
charitable assessment: the Court's opinion was "not just simple" but
"simplistic."91
The underlying source of the problems is jurisprudential. The Court
insists that the texts of the presentment clauses and the vesting of
legislative power in a bicameral Congress dispose of the legislative veto
ex proprio vigore. But constitutional texts do not apply themselves."
Justice White is surely right that the Constitution is silent on the
''precise question" of the legislative veto and neither "directly
authorize[s]" nor "prohibit[s]" it." In order to treat the texts as
dispositive, the Court must tacitly assume the postulate which should
be under examination: whether the legislative veto is congressional
' Kilpatrick, Decision Not Catastrophic after All, NEw HAVEN REGIsTER, July 8, 1983, at
9.
" Levitas, Letter to the Editor, NEW YORK TImEs, July 7, 1983.
"2 See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1063, 1090 (1981): "Like other formalist strategies, strict
intentionalism pretends to constrain constitutional decisionmaking while inviting, if not
demanding, arbitrary manipulation of sources and outcomes."
" 103 S. Ct. at 2798.
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action of the sort to which the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment should apply. To answer this question necessarily
requires a perspective from outside the system: "Syllogism" alone is
incapable of resolving such questions.
The Court's literal approach does not really exclude policy
judgments about the legislative veto, as its adherents claim;' it only
drives them underground, where it is more difficult to scrutinize and
criticize them. It would be better if the Court were open and
aboveboard about its conclusions concerning the pernicious effects of
the legislative veto, rather than slipping hints into footnotes," while
insisting that the language of the Constitution is dispositive and that the
utility of the legislative veto is not in question.
The second reason that the Court's approach in Chadha is
unsatisfactory grows out of the first. The Court's linguistic arguments
and analytical approach depend on dividing government power into
three stark categories-legislative, executive, and judicial-and are
troublesome because they are unpersuasive on their own terms.96 But
the Court's approach is also troubling because it excludes other
considerations that should be relevant. It is as if the Court were
determined to avoid acknowledging what the case is really about.
Representative Levitas has charged: '
The framers of our Constitution would be most surprised to find
that regulations that have the force and effect of law are today put
into effect by unelected officials in the executive branch and in
independent agencies rather than by the Congress. Those "laws" are
not passed by either the House and Senate, nor are they signed by
the President. As this practice developed over the years, Congress
See 103 S. Ct. at 2780-81 ("[The] wisdom [of the legislative veto] is not the concern of the
courts; ... JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one-House
veto is a useful 'political invention'.... But policy arguments supporting even useful 'political
inventions' are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect
to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised").
" See 103 S. Ct. at 2771 n.3 (suggesting that "it is not at all clear" that the House "correctly
understood the relationship between" the resolution it passed and Chadha's deportation, but may
have thought that it was confirming rather than overruling the Attorney General's decision).
' Only a few years ago the Court declared that the proper inquiry in separation of powers cases
was not to be found in the "archaic view" of "three airtight departments of government" but
rather by assessing the actual "impact" a measure would have on the functioning of other
branches of government. Nixon v. GSA, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); cf. id. at 504 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
" Levitas, note 91 supra. See also SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS
345 (1981) (describing increasing use of the legislative veto in the 1970s as one of the best
indicators of the resurgence of Congress after decades of decline).
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attempted to redress the balance with the legislative veto. The
Court's opinion ... failed to mention that it was a response to this
evolving system.
Levitas has a valid point, although he overstates it. The Court does
mention "lawmaking" by administrative agencies, but only in a
footnote and only in the distorted context of answering a rhetorical
question from one of the briefs: "Why is the Attorney General exempt
from submitting his proposed changes in the law to the full bicameral
process?"98 The answer, the Court responds in a footnote that would
do Lewis Carroll proud, is that while administrative rulemaking may
"resemble" lawmaking," and while by statute agency rules do
"prescribe law,'"'"° agency rulemaking is not really "legislative" but
only "quasi-legislative" "Executive action.."... Besides, the Court adds,
the bicameral process is "not necessary" in the case of rulemaking by
agencies because the courts are available to insure that "the will of
Congress has been obeyed."'92
The Court makes short work of the argument by assigning
administrative rulemaking to a different pigeonhole. But the exercise in
semantics misses the point. The growth of the bureaucracy in the
Executive branch and in agencies independent of presidential control
is not of constitutional significance because it raises a nice point of
classification that can be laid to rest once the Court decides whether the
legal category "executive" or "legislative" is more appropriate.
Concern exists because of the reality that most of the federal law
affecting most of the people most of the time is not made through the
bicameral legislative process that the Court's opinion enshrines, but by
administrative decisionmakers, who are not elected and who are not,
by and large, subject to either effective presidential or judicial
control.'°'
The growth of lawmaking power in a vast administrative
bureaucracy may be seen as a threat to the essence of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. Madison (not Hamilton, as the
Court mistakenly states)" summarized that fundamental constitutional
principle in Federalist No. 51 as "contriving the interior structure of
103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16 (quoting from brief for the House of Representatives).
' 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
5 U.S.C. §551(4) (1976).
1o, i03 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
:02 Ibid.
z' BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 1-3 (1982).
1o 03 S. Ct. at 2783.
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the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places." ... The "constant aim" of this strategy, Madison continues, "is
to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
may be a check on the other."'" It is ironic that the Court in Cbadba,
in the name of the constitutional principles of checks and balances and
separation of powers, ends up striking down one of the few existing
checks on lawmaking by the bureaucracy. 7
II
It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to begin a foray into a
new and unexplored area of constitutional law with a decision like
Cbadba. The Court's first opinions in a strange area often are
mechanical, literal, and admit of no exceptions. In the past the Court
solemnly declared, for example, that manufacturing was not interstate
commerce;"3 that a state could not regulate terms of employment;"°
that the First Amendment does not prevent government discharge of
an employee for her beliefs."' In each case, the Court propounded a flat
rule based on abstract reasoning. Each decision appeared as absolute
and unyielding as Cbadba does now, and each did not last.
The Court's early decisions in an area are often rigid and mechanical
because when the Court first faces new issues, it analyzes them in terms
of existing legal concepts which were refined in other contexts. As the
law grows, its logic is tailored to the needs of new situations as
experience demonstrates inadequacies in the existing approach. The
judicial process works like the "anchoring and adjusting" heuristic; a
possible solution is proposed, often one which is suggested by the
structure of the problem, and then adjusted to fit new circumstances.'
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, note 41 supra, at 355. See also Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935).
: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, note 41 supra, at 356.
i:, See Karl, Letter to the Editor, Rule-Making Powers: An American Dilemma, NEW YORK
TIAiES, July 6, 1983, at A18, col. 3. See also Schwartz, The "Legislative Veto"--Now That It's
Gone, NEW YORK TIMEs,June 30, 1983, at A19, col. 2; Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto:
Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L. J. 367 (1977). But see Martin, note 32 supra,
at 262-67 (rejecting arguments that the legislative veto "actually promotes the aims" of separation
of powers doctrine).
'' United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
"* Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 14-18 (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky eds.
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Cbadba is such an "anchor." It remains to be seen to what degree the
legal system will "adjust" this initial result.
It is inherent in the nature of the judicial process that legal doctrines
evolve through a process of what Eugene Rostow described as "back
and fill, zig and zag":"'
[N]o court has ever achieved perfection in its reasoning in its first,
or indeed in its twentieth opinion on the same subject.... In the
nature of law as a continuing process, constantly meeting the shocks
of social change, and of changes in people's ideas of justice, this
characteristic of law must be true, even for our greatest and most
insightful judges. They grapple with a new problem, deal with it
over and over again, as its dimensions change. They settle one case,
and find themselves tormented by its unanticipated progeny. They
back and fill, zig and zag, groping through the mist for a line of
thought which will in the end satisfy their standards of craft and
their vision of the policy of the community they must try to
interpret.... There are cases that lead nowhere, stunted branches
and healthy ones.... Yet the felt necessities of society have their
impact, and the law emerges, gnarled, asymmetrical, but very much
alive....
Rostow's description is surely correct for those parts of the law
where we can look back and see lines of cases developing over time.
When courts confront the same or similar issues over and over again,
they do explore, modify, refine, and develop the law. But Rostow gives
only half the picture. The judicial process does not inevitably erode a
decision like Chadha."3 Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, lawyers
and the community at large accept the Court's initial decision as
settling the law. Unfortunately, no one has come up with an entirely
satisfactory explanation for why the community recognizes some
Supreme Court opinions as precedents while others become stunted
branches of the law.
Often it is not the Court but the community reaction which signals
that a decision is unacceptable and initiates a new cycle of legal
evolution."' It is not so much the formal checks in the Constitution
1982). See also Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. (Jan. 1984); Ackerman, The Structure of Subchapter C: An Anthropological Comment, 87
YALE L. J. 436, 444-45 (1977).
"' Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 123,
141-42 (1962).
.. But see LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9 (1949).
"' See generally BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 110-11 (1975). But cf. Burt,
Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L. J. (forthcoming).
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that select which of the Supreme Court's "anchor" decisions stand and
which are "adjusted.. '.. Rather, a combination of criticism and the
rhythm of litigation itself acts as an invisible hand leading the Court
to reexamine decisions which have not been accepted by the
community.
If the principles of law declared in an opinion are recognized as
dispositive, the Court's statement of the law will stand, literally
unchallenged."" On the other hand, if people continue to litigate, and
lawyers and courts continue to have doubts about how these cases
should be resolved, the Supreme Court is eventually moved to
reexamine its previous statement of the law. No decision, not even a
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, is a precedent on the day
it is decided. It becomes a precedent if it is recognized and accepted as
authoritative to resolve other controversies."7 The process of legal
evolution which Rostow describes is brought into play only when a
significant number of people do not accept existing statements of the
law as ending controversy in the area."8
The question that remains for the legislative veto is how this court
which sits in judgment on the judgments of the Supreme Court will
respond to Chadha. It is easy to get so caught up in criticizing Supreme
Court opinions that we lose sight of the fact that a poor opinion is not
the same thing as a bad decision. The craft of writing opinions is
important, because method may sometimes lead courts to decisions
wiser than the individual judges who make them and because opinions
may influence the community's reaction to a decision. But courts, no
less than the rest of us, sometimes reach a right-or at least an
acceptable-result for the wrong reasons.
Once the Court has spoken, as it has in Chadha, evaluation must
move to a new level. It is less important now what the Court should
"' See also ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 46-47 (1980).
" See Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). The
Rubin-Priest thesis is couched in terms of selecting rules for relitigation and modification if they
are not economically efficient. In principle, however, any values that are systematically held by
the community could make themselves felt on the law through a similar mechanism, see Elliott,
note 111 supra. Absolute unanimity is not required for a legal issue to remain settled, of course.
It is usually enough to prevent an issue from being reexamined by the Supreme Court, for
example, if the lower federal courts have no difficulty deciding the cases that follow based on
existing legal principles.
.. Deutsch, Law as Metaphor: A Structural Analysis of Legal Process, 66 GEO. L.J. 1339, 1340
(1978). See also Eisenberg, Private Ordering through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 649-53 (1976).
"' See JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (Lalor tr. 1879).
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have done than how other parts of the total lawmaking system should
respond to the Court's decision. In deciding whether to acquiesce in
the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha, or to pursue variations of the
legislative veto in the hope that the Court will eventually soften its
statement of the law, the legislative veto must be viewed from a
different perspective. The germane question is whether the legislative
veto is too valuable a part of the evolving structure of government to
be abandoned because of one Supreme Court decision, or whether we
should get along without it.
A. EFFECTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
Although the literature debating the legal issues posed by the
legislative veto is extensive, relatively little attention has been paid to
how the veto actually works in practice."' Legislative vetoes are not
alike. They exist in different statutory and political environments, their
purposes and effects differ. How well the legislative veto works under
the immigration laws has little bearing on the device's utility under the
War Powers Resolution,'29 where its function is quite different.''
1. An effective check on the bureaucracy? The arguments in favor of
the legislative veto were summarized by Representative Elliott Levitas
when introducing a bill to create a comprehensive legislative veto over
agency rules."' According to Levitas, the legislative veto "give[s] the
public, through their elected representatives, an input into and a
control over the rules which govern their lives:"'2
If you ask the man on the street who makes the laws in this country,
he would likely tell you that Congress does. But he would be
wrong, because more edicts regulating his life are promulgated by
unelected bureaucrats than are passed by the elected Congress.
Expanded use of the legislative veto, according to Representative
Levitas, would "help cut down on bureaucratic red tape, reduce the
"' Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative
Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977) (case studies under five statutes providing legislative
vetoes); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1980) (historical studies of legislative vetoes in sixteen areas
of law) (cited hereafter as STUDIES).
" Pub. L. No. 93-148, §5, 87 Stat. 555, 556-57 (1973), 50 U.S.C. §1544 (1976).
... See Fisher, A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes, 93 POL SCI. Q. 241 (1978); compare
McClure, Legislative Veto Provisions under the Immigration Laws, in STUDIES, note 119 supra, at
378, with Nanes, Legislative Vetoes: The War Powers Resolution, id. at 579.
129 CONG. REC. H931-34 (daily ed., March 8, 1983) (statement of Rep. Levitas).
" Id. at H931-32.
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regulatory outpouring from Federal agencies, and make the rules that
are adopted more reasonable." '24
Opponents of the legislative veto dispute the claim that it is an
effective check on the bureaucracy. It is certainly true that Congress
seldom actually invokes the legislative veto. Precise statistics are not
available, but it seems clear that there are many more statutes creating
legislative vetoes than there are instances in which the veto has actually
been exercised. There have been a few well-publicized cases in which
Congress used the legislative veto to reject major agency rules. In May
1982, for example, Congress used a two-house legislative veto to
override an FTC rule requiring dealers to disclose known defects in
used cars to potential customers.2S In that instance, however, an
ordinary statute, passed by both houses and subject to presidential veto,
almost certainly would have been forthcoming to nullify the rule if the
legislative veto had not been available. Well-organized, politically
effective groups do not need the legislative veto to see to it that an
agency rule is reversed by Congress if it imposes significant costs on
them but the beneficiaries of the rule are diffuse and disorganized.'
If the legislative veto is worth saving, it must be because it provides
something distinctive that is not available through the ordinary,
statutory process. Antonin Scalia has argued that the legislative veto
achieves nothing of substance that could not be done at least as well
through the ordinary legislative process, except to avoid the President's
veto and the requirement of passage by the other house.'" That is not
entirely correct, nor are these small differences. Proponents of the
legislative veto point out that the process of passing a statute to
overrule agency actions is "cumbersome and time-consuming.''. In
contrast, a legislative veto is a resolution of disapproval which, because
it has no substantive content, cannot be amended, either on the floor
or in committee.'" Moreover, the statutory time limits within which a
legislative veto must be exercised impose a discipline on the legislative
process which means that as a practical matter subcommittee hearings
"I Id. at H932.
... 128 CONG. REC. S5402 (daily ed., May 18, 1982); 128 CONG. REc. H2883 (daily ed., May
26, 1982), vetoing 46 FED. REG. 41328-78 (1981).
" See generally Wilson, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (Wilson ed. 1980);
see also MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
" Scalia, note 37 supra, at 24. See also Martin, note 32 supra, at 288-90.
" Levitas, note 122 supra, at H933.
See Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional
Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 456 (1977); Fisher, Introduction, in STUDIES at 1, 4; but cf.
Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d at 476 (Wilkey, J.).
152 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
are rarely held, and committee reports are almost never written to
accompany legislative veto resolutions.
The legislative veto does involve a simplification of the legislative
process, but what is gained in speed is lost in understanding. Stripped
of hearings, reports, and committee deliberations, members of
Congress have no way to reach informed, independent decisions about
how to vote on legislative veto resolutions. Moreover, without
subcommittee hearings and internal deliberation even members of the
subcommittee directly involved become virtual prisoners of their staff.
It is a mistake, therefore, to conceive of the legislative veto as action by
Congress, or by a single house, in the same sense that passing a statute
is action by Congress; statutes creating legislative vetoes in effect
delegate power to review agency actions to the staff of a congressional
subcommittee, at least in the first instance.'30 Agencies tend to enter
into negotiations at an early stage to ensure that the agency's proposals
will be acceptable, rather than run the risk of suffering a legislative
veto later. 3' Thus, a legislative veto may affect policy even though it
has not been exercised, and, as at least one lower court has correctly
held, the fact that the veto has not been exercised should not immunize
a statute from challenge under Chadba.'32
The true significance of the legislative veto cannot be measured by
the infrequency with which it has been used. The legislative veto
creates the most effective kind of power, the kind that does not have
to be used to be effective. It is no exaggeration to say that "the main
benefit of the congressional veto is that it exists. Its very existence will
sensitize the bureaucracy and make it more responsive.'. The key
question, however, is "more responsive" to what? The political
calculus for a group potentially affected by agency action changes once
a legislative veto enters the picture. No longer does effective political
recourse involve waiting until after agency and court have ruled and
then attempting to move a majority of 535 legislators to act. Instead, it
becomes possible to influence policy before the agency acts by
persuading a few key members of Congress and/or congressional staff
members.
Many public interest lawyers oppose the legislative veto for this
reason, contending that it would only increase the influence of
" See Levitas, note 122 supra, at H933.
... See Bruff & Gellhorn, note 119 supra, at 1409-12.
"' "A retained one-house veto is unconstitutional even when not exercised." EEOC v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 52 U.S.L.W. 2152 (Sept. 20, 1983).
"' Levitas, note 122 supra, at H933; see also BOLTON, note 8 supra, at 22-24.
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industry and other "[w]ealthy, well-organized and experienced special
interests.' ' . Former Representative Robert Eckhardt has been quoted
as saying that "[r]ather than increasing Congressional control"
legislation to expand the legislative veto "would simply provide more
business for the high-priced Washington lobbyist.. '..
Which groups would actually gain in influence if the legislative veto
moved debate over "administrative regulations and their ultimate
decisions into the private arena of congressional offices" ''3 is not
self-evident. The dominance of subcommittee staff under legislative
veto statutes might lead decisionmaking to be less "political" than
when the ordinary statutory process is the only congressional
mechanism available for overturning agency decisions. On the other
hand, because the legislative veto poses a much more credible threat to
the substance of agency decisions, it probably does tend to reduce
agency independence and the degree to which decisions can be based
on "expertise," and to increase the political component in agency
decisions. As former FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk points out,
the legislative veto "invite[s] an affected industry to try its case in a
political forum rather than go through the painstaking process of
building a record and arguing its case on the merits.."37
The legislative veto affects the administrative process procedurally
as well as substantively by opening up a new congressional arena in
which to debate issues that are before agencies. In the congressional
arena, however, procedural requirements which are intended to insure
fairness and equality of access in the administrative process do not
apply.' As a consequence, the procedural due process issues raised by
the legislative veto can be substantial."9 Even if it does not violate the
Constitution, it certainly is problematic that the legislative veto creates
an "appeal" from administrative decisions to a forum that typically
listens to representations of fact ex parte, does not give all sides equal
opportunities to be heard, does not explain its decisions, and from
which there is no appeal. But the threat to the integrity of
'" Green & Zwenig, The Legislative Veto Is Bad Lay, NATION, Oct. 28, 1978, at 434 (Director
and staff attorney of Nader-affiliated Congress Watch); McGowan, note 8 supra, at 1149.
" Eckhardt is quoted in Green & Zwenig, note 134 supra, at 434.
" Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Government Relations of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and Related Bills, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 257 (1975) (statement of Professor Walter Gellhorn).
" See Mulock, Legislative Vetoes in Selected Regulatory Agencies, in STUDIES, note 119 supra,
560, 569.
... See Bruff & Gellhorn, note 119 supra, at 1412-14.
"' See Martin, note 32 supra, at 261 n.22; see also Javits & Klein, note 129 supra, at 466.
154 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
administrative procedures is more subtle as well. Agencies may be
encouraged to avoid public rulemaking proceedings altogether,
resorting to ad hoc methods of making policy to evade the legislative
veto." The real difference of opinion is not over the effects of the
legislative veto, but whether it is a good idea to employ a mechanism
that cuts through bureaucratic red tape, subverts administrative due
process, and makes unelected bureaucrats more responsive to the
people yet increases the power of special interests."'
2. The effect on Congress. A second set of objections, in its simplest
form, is that the legislative veto encourages Congress to make broad
delegations of power to administrative decisionmakers. Without the
veto, the argument runs, Congress would be forced to write better
(more detailed) statutes "2 or even to return power to "the people.'4.. A
more sophisticated version of the thesis, put by Professor David
Martin, is that the legislative veto gives Congress a means to "make a
public show of addressing an important issue, while yet evading direct
responsibility for the necessary affirmative choices."'"
Both versions of the argument depend, however, on the dubious
premise that it is a bad thing for Congress to "avoid" deciding issues,
at least those issues worth characterizing as "of an essentially political
nature.''.. Professor Martin writes:'
Broad delegations are not an inevitable affliction visited on
Congress by some outside force. They are inevitable only in the
sense that the courts are not currently disposed to employ the
nondelegation doctrine to save Congress from the consequences.
But Congress itself, provided it musters the political will, can curb
its delegates through more precise standards that channel the
exercise of delegated power.
See Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies, 24 Whi. &
MARY L. REV. 79, 91-92 (1982); see also Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule"
Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy through an Exceptions Process, DUKE L.
J. (forthcoming).
14, See LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 77-78 (1938) (praising British techniques of
"laying on the table" which is similar to legislative veto as providing regular and open way for
individual legislators to influence administrative policy, whereas in U.S. legislators must use
"other measures" to put pressure on administrators).
" See BOLTON, note 8 supra, at 49-50; see also Martin, note 32 supra, at 289-93.
", See Scalia, note 37 supra, at 25.
',Martin, note 32 supra, at 273.
', Scalia, note 37 supra, at 26.
'"Martin, note 32 supra, at 288.
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Ironically, these arguments against the legislative veto can be traced
back to an attitude common among lawyers today that romanticizes the
role of statutes in the total lawmaking system.
Lawyers, aware of limits to the institutional competence of courts,
are naturally attracted to the idea of "leaving" tough issues to the
legislature. Most lawyers view legislatures through the eyes of judges.
Under the doctrine of legislative supremacy, courts are supposed to act,
with few exceptions, as if legislatures were omniscient when they have
spoken within their purview. But this does not mean that legislatures
are omniscient, or that they ought to decide as many issues as possible.
The truth is that often the decision that Congress would have made is
not as good as the one that was made by another lawmaking body to
which Congress delegated power. Prevailing constitutional theory is,
of course, that the legislature must make basic policy decisions to
"canalize" administrative discretion "within banks that keep it from
overflowing.'.. 7 But it does not follow that the narrower the banks, the
better the statute. On the contrary, there are instances in which it is
clear that Congress erred by writing statutes which were too specific,
and by deciding issues on political grounds that might better have been
left to agency expertise.
4 8
At least sometimes it is a virtue, not a defect, that the legislative veto
enables Congress to feel comfortable making a delegation when it is
"unable or unwilling to delimit the precise boundaries of executive
action."'4 The same considerations that counsel courts to avoid
deciding issues which are not "ripe" often apply to Congress as
well.
There is, of course, a balance between the over general and the over
specific in writing statutes, but the dream of a perfect code remains an
illusion, as it always has been. Those who condemn the legislative veto
because it encourages Congress to delegate power without writing
detailed standards are moved by too great a thirst for certainty in the
law. Ambiguity is often valuable, even necessary in affairs of state.
Consider the War Powers Resolution. 5 Suppose Congress were to
write detailed standards into law as conditions on the President's use
of force, and suppose further that a situation arose in which the
President felt it necessary to disobey them. Only two things could
"' Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
"' See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 121-28 (1981).
"'Javits & Klein, note 129 supra, at 456.
.. Note 120 supra.
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happen, and neither would be desirable. It could become clear, either
by judicial decision or through acquiescence, that the President alone
decides to use military force, or it could be decided that Congress, not
the President, has exclusive power to act in this area. The thirst for
certainty would have been satisfied, but the state of the law would not
necessarily have been improved. We might well have been better off
to preserve the Constitution that the framers gave us, which with
studied ambiguity makes the President Commander-in-Chief and gives
Congress the power to declare war and raise armies.'" One need not
accept the extreme view that all separation of powers issues should be
left to the ebb and flow of political forces' to recognize that there are
situations in which it is desirable for Congress and the Executive to
share power, while preserving ambiguity as to the precise authority of
each.
To the extent that the legislative veto permits Congress to make
delegations that it would not otherwise make, and to the extent that the
legislative veto is used judiciously or not at all, it may be a useful tool
in some contexts for maintaining a healthy balance between executive
and legislative authority.
B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
A variety of alternatives to the legislative veto have been suggested
and their advantages and disadvantages debated. "3 Substitutes suggested
for the legislative veto range from full-scale statutory action by
Congress to oversight by a committee, including: (1) direct statutory
repeal of agency action;'" (2) amendments limiting an agency's
jurisdiction;'. (3) appropriations riders restricting the use of funds for
specified purposes;' s6 (4) rewriting statutes to require that agency rules
' A leading analysis of the historical record concludes that the original intention of the framers
was to give Congress "at least a coordinate, and probably the dominant, role in initiating all but
the most obviously defensive wars." Lofgren, War-Making under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L. J. 672, 701 (1972). The suggestion in the text of this article is that
Lofgren's first interpretation, "coordinate" authority, is the correct one.
"' See CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 260-379
(1980).
.. Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto,"
32 AD. L. REV. 667 (1980); Bruff & Gellhorn, note 119 supra, at 1420-23; see also Levinson, note
140 supra, at 96-1i1 (reviewing state systems); CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY
AGENCIES, note 47 supra.
Kaiser, note 153 supra, at 669-73.
Id. at 673-87.
"' Id. at 687-96. See also Martin, note 32 supra, at 274 n.61.
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must be enacted affirmatively by Congress;"' (5) statutory requir-
ements for consultation among agencies;"' (6) requirements for
notification of Congress or of a committee before action is taken;"9 (7)
committee reports;' and (8) to "stage an embarrassing oversight
hearing. ' '6' At the statutory end of the spectrum, the alternatives are
generally effective when they are actually invoked, but suffer from the
disadvantage that they require overcoming the massive institutional
inertia of Congress, not to mention surviving the President's veto. At
the other end of the spectrum, the substitutes that rely on committee
action are, like the legislative veto, easier to effect but also less
effective.
The single substitute that comes closest to duplicating the legislative
veto is an appropriations rider-a condition prohibiting the agency
from using funds for a particular purpose which is written into the
legislation to appropriate funds. While technically voted by the
Congress as a whole, as a practical matter a rider often can be added in
committee. Action is generally required by the appropriations
committee, however, rather than by the standing committee that has
substantive jurisdiction.' 2 The appropriations bill to which the rider is
attached is subject to the President's veto, but as a practical matter, a
veto is unlikely. As it has become increasingly difficult for Congress
to agree on a budget in recent years, however, it has also become more
difficult to use the appropriations process as a means of controlling
agency action. Even if it is possible to get a rider adopted, there is no
guarantee that it will be effective. If an agency receives funding under
more than one appropriation, as many do, the Executive branch retains
some power to evade the effect of a rider by "re-programming"
unrestricted funds and using them to pursue the policy which had
incurred Congress's ire."3 And even if the rider is effective, its effect
is only temporary, since a rider only lasts as long as the appropriations
authority to which it is attached, usually only a single fiscal year.
None of the alternatives is an exact substitute for the legislative veto,
but from among the total array of techniques available, one or another
can usually be found that is tolerably serviceable if Congress is
"' See Lewis, note 60 supra.
Kaiser, note 153 supra, at 696-701.
" Id. at 701-04.
" Id. at 704-09.
"' Bruff & Gellhorn, note 119 supra, at 1423.
See generally Fisher, Congressional Budget Refornm The First Two Years, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS.
413, 416-17 (1977).
' See Kaiser, note 153 supra, at 689.
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determined to overturn agency or Executive action."4 The real
significance of the legislative veto, however, is found less in the
instances in which it is invoked than in the way that its existence alters
the working relationship between agency and subcommittee staff.
Here too the divergence between the legislative veto and the
alternatives is greatest. None of the suggested substitutes is nearly as
certain or predictable as the legislative veto, and none so clearly gives
the committee with substantive jurisdiction (as opposed to the
appropriations committee) and its staff the primary say over an
agency's proposals.6" The threat of congressional review by means
other than legislative veto is less likely to produce the advance
negotiations between agencies and congressional committee staffs that
are the hallmark of legislative vetoes.
This is not necessarily a great loss, however. Only the most extreme
partisan of Congress could think that congressional staff are the best
body imaginable to exercise essentially unreviewable power over
Executive and agency decisionmaking. To be sure, some of the
problems that accompany the legislative veto would also result from
any other reviewing institution; for example, extra costs and delay
would result from any additional level of review of agency decisions.
But most of the problems which accompany the legislative veto are not
inherent in the concept of creating an additional mechanism to review
agency decisions. They result from using congressional staff to
perform the reviewing function. If one broadens the focus, so that
substitutes for the legislative veto may include mechanisms outside
Congress, a number of alternatives to the legislative veto are
attractive.
Most states provide a mechanism, in addition to judicial review and
statutory amendment, for overriding agency rules.'" State mechanisms
for reviewing agency rules take a number of different forms, including
one- and two-house legislative vetoes. In addition to those with
legislative vetoes, however, nine states allow a legislative committee to
suspend a rule temporarily pending final legislative action; at least
'I See also Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming).
' For an account of authorization and appropriations committees as competing "subsystems"
and an interpretation of the legislative veto as an attempt by authorization committees to increase
their own authority, see DODD & SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
222-24, 233-34 (1979).
" Levinson, note 140 supra, at 81-83; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
RESTORING THE BALANCE: LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
(1977).
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fifteen states have advisory committees that systematically review
administrative rules and make recommendations to the legislature
concerning those that should be set aside; and in another three states,
the advisory committee not only recommends which rules should be
set aside, but if it finds a rule objectionable, the burden of proof shifts
against the agency on judicial review. This last approach, an advisory
committee recommendation that shifts the burden of proof, is also
recommended in the latest revision of the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act.'67
Direct review of administrative rules by legislatures has been
challenged on separation of powers grounds in several states,"' and the
challenges are likely to intensify after Chadha." An independent
commission to review administrative rules is, however, an attractive
alternative to the legislative veto at the federal level. A new body could
be created by Congress with authority to review and suspend exercises
of delegated lawmaking authority, or even to set them aside entirely.
If Congress may delegate power to make rules, presumably it may
provide by statute that the rules do not become effective unless they are
approved by an administrative review commission. An administrative
review commission could act as a check on arbitrary or unwise uses of
administrative authority at least as well as the legislative veto, thus
meeting one of the primary objectives claimed by supporters of the
legislative veto. On the other hand, because the administrative review
commission would be outside Congress, the procedural and substan-
tive problems raised by the legislative veto would be ameloriated. It is
possible that Congress could make appointments to some forms of an
administrative review commission, but the Constitution would require
that appointments to others be made by the President.'
"' NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL STATE
ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §3-204(d) (rev. 1981).
", Levinson, note 140 supra, at 83 nn.17-21.
.' Peterson, Court's Outlawing Of Congress's Veto Casts Shadows on State Legislatures, NEW
YORK TIMES, July 22, 1983, at A8, cols. 1-3.
" The course least vulnerable to challenge would be an independent commission insulated by
statute from both Congress and the President, whose members would be nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. The configuration most vulnerable to challenge would
be to give the power to suspend rules to a commission composed of members of Congress ex
officio. See Art. I, sec. 6, cl. 2. Between the two, in a debatable area, lies a commission some or
all of whose members would be appointed by Congress. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-43
(1976). The Court did recognize exceptions to the requirement of presidential appointment,
however. If the rulemaking review commission's role were limited to investigating and
recommending to Congress which rules be set aside by statute-and perhaps even if the
commission were given power to suspend rules temporarily, or to affect the burden of proof on
judicial review-Congress might well be able to appoint its members. 424 U.S. at 141.
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It may seem odd that Congress can create a commission to do what
Congress cannot do itself,7 ' but the parts of the Constitution relied on
by the Court in Chadha are limitations on Congress, not on the
instrumentalities that Congress may create. The Constitution does not
require that the commission's action (as opposed to Congress's) must
be presented to the President for his or her veto. An administrative
review commission would not infringe on the judiciary's power, as
long as an ultimate right of appeal to the courts is preserved,'" nor
would an administrative review commission be performing a judicial
function. The commission's role would be to second-guess agencies on
discretionary decisions within the ambit of their authority, a function
which the courts steadfastly disclaim for themselves.'
C. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO IN PERSPECTIVE
Legislative veto statutes range along a spectrum. On one end is the
public law, represented by the War Powers Resolution or the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. In
these instances, Congress has used the legislative veto to control
affirmative exercises of power by the Executive. By and large, the
powers at issue have not been delegated by Congress, but are powers
that the President claims as inherent, a claim that Congress generally
disputes. In some instances, judicial review is not available to resolve
the controversy, in others it may not be desirable to resolve the issue
in the courts.'74 The need for the legislative veto here may be greatest.
Substitutes for legislative vetoes of this kind are not easy to imagine.
Those that exist lack one of the virtues of the legislative veto statute:
Congress can call into question the President's assertion of unilateral
power without actually having to do anything. Viewed from this
perspective, the War Powers Resolution may be a success after
all.'7
At the other end of the spectrum, the private law end, are the
legislative veto statutes in which the public law implications are much
more attenuated, but the interests of individuals in fair treatment are
more pronounced. Immigration cases like Chadha are at this end of the
spectrum.
See 103 S. Ct. at 2803 (White, J., dissenting).
,' Cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
"' See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 557-58 (1978).
' See generally Casper, note 81 supra; see also Choper, note 152 supra.
. But cf. Nanes, Legislative Vetoes: The War Powers Resolution, in STUDIES, at 570, 602.
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At the private law end of the spectrum, no unique need for the
legislative veto is apparent. If Congress regards the Executive's
practices in granting suspensions of deportation to aliens as too lenient,
it has a variety of effective techniques available for sending signals to
the INS. To be sure, most other techniques are prospective only, and
in the meantime a number of decisions that Congress regards as
erroneous may stand, but that may not be an unacceptable price. On
the other hand, the problems that the legislative veto raises are most
intense at the private law end of the spectrum. Even if not ultimately
a violation of the Due Process Clause, the lack of equal treatment and
fair and regular procedures accompanying the legislative veto are most
bothersome here, as are the opportunities for special influence, be it
political or financial.
Between the two poles lie a range of situations in which the public
and private dimensions are intermingled in varying degrees: FTC rules
defining unfair trade practices'76 and EPA rules concerning hazardous
wastes1" are two examples which lie somewhere in the middle. Here
too there are plenty of substitutes for the legislative veto, although
none is its exact equivalent. In the middle range, a balance is called for.
Generally the benefits are speculative and are not worth the costs in
arbitrariness, both procedural and substantive. Congress and the
President, which together may create a statutory scheme for delegated
lawmaking, ought, however, to have discretion to choose that politics
play a larger role in regulating unfair trade practices than in cleaning
up hazardous waste disposal sites or vice versa. To pick the right mix
of politics and expertise to be built into delegated lawmaking is a
prototypical political question of the sort that ought to be left to
Congress and the President, not put out of their reach by the Court.
Chadha, of course, would not leave such choices to the political
branches, but strikes down the legislative veto all along the spectrum.
Chadha is not a disaster, however. In most areas, passable substitutes are
available for the legislative veto. It is unlikely, consequently, that
community reaction will lead to major "adjustment" of the "anchor"
staked out by the Court in Chadha. In the few areas where the
legislative veto is uniquely valuable (such as the War Powers
Resolution), opportunities for litigation are few and far between, and
it is unlikely that the judicial process will be able to correct itself by
carving out exceptions through the "ebb and flow" of cases about
'15 U.S.C. §57a-1.
42 U.S.C. §96S5.
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which Rostow wrote.' 8 Perhaps under a torrent of criticism the Court
would pull back. Perhaps even a consensus among scholars that
Chadha does not reach the public law end of the spectrum would
suffice to keep the legislative veto alive under the War Powers
Resolution by keeping the issue open. But neither seems likely.
Chadha has probably stated the law for some time to come.
III
From one perspective, writing a broad, all-encompassing
opinion in Chadha may have been a wise exercise of judicial
statesmanship. Sometimes the Supreme Court can unlock latent,
creative forces by eliminating weak or deficient parts of the existing
legal order, thereby clearing room for new growth.' 9
In statutes, as elsewhere, new concepts are slow to emerge if an
existing device is available to fill a need. Occasionally accidents or
circumstances do give birth to a new device such as the legislative veto.
If it meets a need that no existing device satisfies, there is a strong
tendency for the "mutant" to reproduce rapidly as it is copied from one
statute to another. Without competitors or obvious countervailing
considerations to limit its growth, such a new legal device may spread
rapidly until it becomes so established that it dominates the field and
squeezes out the possibility of alternatives. The geometric growth of
recent statutes incorporating legislative vetoes is evidence that this
phenomenon has been occurring. Congress has been writing legislative
vetoes into statutes where the need for the veto is weak at best.' °
Moreover, as the legislative veto has become fashionable, Congress has
not been inclined to give serious consideration to possible alternatives
for controlling administrative discretion under broad delegations.
Paradoxically, then, by striking down the legislative veto, in the
long run the Court may have advanced the professed goals of
supporters of the legislative veto to control administrative discretion.
See note 112 supra.
" Cf. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 8-15 (1982).
Examples include a legislative veto over President's extension of production period for Naval
petroleum reserves, Pub. L. No. 94-258, 90 Stat. 303 §201(3), (1976); a veto over rules establishing
grievance procedures for institutionalized persons, §7(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349,
352-55 (1980); a veto over changes to the rules governing airline pension plans, §43(f)(3), Pub.
L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1752 (1979), or to retirement plans for employees of the District of
Columbia, §164, Pub. L. No. 96-122, 93 Stat. 866, 891-92 (1979).
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Deprived of the legislative veto, Congress may now be forced to
consider alternative devices.
The idea that Chadha may advance the cause of controlling
administrative discretion, however, is only speculation. There is no
cause for rejoicing when the Court strikes down a legal device that it
assumes is "efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating the functions
of government.' 8' To be sure, there may be a difference between good
policy and what the Constitution requires. One of the things(unconstitutional" means is that something violates principles so
fundamental that no other considerations may save it. It is, however,
no virtue in a constitutional law that it lays to waste political
innovations which are efficient, convenient, and useful (as the Court
says it assumes the legislative veto to be).
A. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A starting point for an alternative approach to the issues in Chadha
can be found in Justice White's dissent. There are two distinct levels
to the dissent. White answers the majority's formalistic, textual
arguments with a conceptual argument of his own. The legislative veto
is not the equivalent of a statute, White argues, because Congress has
"reserv[ed]" a veto in the delegation and hence the veto does not make
a change in the "legal status quo...... White supports his view that a
condition built into a statute is not an independent exercise of
legislative authority with two cases from the late 1930s which had
upheld statutes giving "vetoes" to private groups.'8' If this were all
there were to White's opinion, it would be little better than the
majority's equally mechanical approach.
White's dissent, however, operates on a second level as well. He sees
the legislative veto in a larger perspective of evolving constitutional
structure and relationships.'" White begins by tracing the history of
the legislative veto, concluding that "it has not been a sword with
which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the
other branches" but a "reservation of ultimate authority necessary if
.' 103 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
I' Id. at 2806-07.
.. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); and U.S. v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533,
577 (1939), cited 103 S. Ct. at 2803 (White, J., dissenting). But cf. Martin, note 32 supra, at 297-98
(distinguishing Currin on ground that requirements of presentation and bicameral action apply
"only to members of Congress").
I" Cf. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Article I as the nation's
lawmaker.' 8. White then describes the growth of the "modern
administrative state" in which "legislative authority is routinely
delegated to the Executive branch, to the independent regulatory
agencies and to private individuals and groups."'" Quoting Justice
Jackson, White asserts that the rise of the administrative state has been
"the most significant legal trend of the last century.' 87 A plethora of
administrative bodies with lawmaking authority has now "become a
veritable fourth branch of Government, which has deranged our
three-branch legal theories.""
White criticizes the majority for not "facing the reality of
administrative lawmaking,"'" but what significance White himself
ascribes to administrative lawmaking is a bit murky. He suggests that
the "wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad delegations [to
administrative lawmakers] are matters that still have not been put to
rest.""' White turns around, however, and argues in a key passage that
"If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and
executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand Article I as
forbidding Congress from also reserving a check on legislative powers
for itself. 19. Strictly speaking, White's point is a non sequitur: The fact
that Congress may delegate legislative authority, without more, has
nothing to do with whether Congress may reserve a legislative veto in
the delegation. White comes back to the supposed inconsistency
between the result in Chadha and the growth of administrative
lawmaking at the conclusion of his opinion: "[The Court's holding]
reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that
held by the Courts which sanctioned the modern administrative
state."'92 It is clear that Justice White considers the growth of the
"modern administrative state" to be relevant, but just exactly how it
bears on the questions before the Court he never explains.
White indicates that he would not necessarily hold all legislative
vetoes constitutional.' 93 Instead of the majority's approach that the texts
of Article I are dispositive, White contends that the "Constitution does
" 103 S. Ct. at 2796.
" Id. at 2801.
Id., quoting FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
" Ibid.
1 i03 S. Ct. at 2803.
"¢ Id. at 2802.
' Ibid.
'n Id. at 2810.
' bid.
INS v. CHADHA 165
not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative veto," and that in the
face of the "silence of the Constitution on the precise question," the
Court should "determine whether the legislative veto is consistent
with the purposes of Art. I and the principles of Separation of
Powers."'" Justice White would analyze each legislative veto in its
individual context. It turns out, however, that White's general
"constitutional principle of separation of powers"'" has very little
content. Measures would violate the separation of powers principle
only if they were contrary to "some express provision in the
Constitution" assigning authority to another branch,9' or if they
"prevent" another branch "from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions."'' Most legislative vetoes would easily survive
these tests, although Justice White maintains that "a legislative check
on an inherently executive function, for example that of initiating
prosecutions, [would pose] an entirely different question. "198
There is obvious appeal to White's approach as contrasted with the
majority's literalism, but several important weaknesses are apparent.
For one thing, the textual basis for a general separation of powers
principle is unclear, a factor to which the majority alludes in explaining
its own refusal to follow this line of analysis. The separation of powers
principle that Justice White describes has little if any independent
content beyond what is already expressed or implied by other
provisions of the Constitution. White's approach would, moreover,
call into question those exercises of the legislative veto at the public law
end of the spectrum, where the legislative veto is arguably most
valuable, while doing nothing to remedy the abuses of the legislative
veto in the private law area, where it seems least fitted to its task.
The weaknesses in his approach are even deeper and more
fundamental. White's opinion fails to persuade at least in part because
both the concept of the "administrative state" and the jurisprudential
underpinnings that make it relevant to the issue before the Court
remain unclear. Nonetheless there is great intuitive appeal to Justice
White's recognition that the federal government "has become an
endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers," and that the
" Id. at 2798.
... Id. at 2808.
Id. at 2809.
Id., quoting Nixon v. GSA, 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977).
Id. at 2810.
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Constitution must be interpreted "with the flexibility to respond to
contemporary needs."' "
B. THE PROBLEM OF QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
Underlying the debate between White and the majority is a problem
with ramifications that go far beyond the legislative veto. In a nutshell,
the problem is that the text of the Constitution creates not four
branches of government, but three. White and the majority differ both
conceptually and jurisprudentially over the significance of the changes
in the structure of the federal government which have occurred since
the New Deal. White conceives of these changes as creating the
"modern administrative state." The majority, on the other hand, sees
them as merely a series of delegations to the Executive," a
phenomenon that goes back to the beginning of the Republic.
White's term, "the modern administrative state," is used with
"increasing regularity" by contemporary political scientists, 1 but is
only beginning to achieve currency among lawyers. 2 The concept of
an "administrative state" goes well beyond the idea of delegation of
lawmaking power to administrative decisionmakers. Indeed, the
concept of an "administrative state" goes even further than the
metaphor of a Fourth Branch. Describing administrative lawmakers as
a "Fourth Branch" implies that they have achieved parity with the
three original branches of government. The "administrative state," on
the other hand, suggests that the growth of administrative decision-
making is significant, not only in its own right, but also because
administrative lawmaking has become the central lawmaking
institution, and thereby that it has transformed the functions and
relationships among other institutions of government. The term "the
modern administrative state" implies, in short, that a qualitative change
in the nature of government as a whole has resulted from the growth
of administrative lawmaking.
To spell out the implications of Justice White's term is not to
endorse it. Lumping a number of institutional changes together under
the rubric of "the administrative state" substitutes a slogan for more
precise analysis of particular institutions. In at least one crucial respect,
'" Id. at 2798.
'o See 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
"' FREEMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 3 (1978); see also DODD & SCHOTT, note 165 supra.
'0' See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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however, White's metaphor is more perspicacious than the familiar
concept of delegation which the majority employs. Delegation is a
mechanistic metaphor: it implies that the thing which is delegated is
the same in the hands of the recipient as it was before, and that both
parties are otherwise left unchanged by the transaction. The
"administrative state," on the other hand, suggests a concept of
government as a holistic system. Changing one part of such a system
necessarily alters the whole.
In this respect, at least, White's understanding of the significance of
the rise of administrative lawmaking is superior to the majority's. The
growth of a vast administrative bureaucracy with lawmaking powers
is not a mere additive change to the structure of government.
Inevitably it has transformed the nature and functions of existing
institutions as well. The increasing importance of administrative
modes of lawmaking has, for example, transformed the role of the
courts in many areas of law. Rather than make common-law tort rules,
for example, today federal courts are more likely to review generic
rulemaking by agencies such as the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration. No longer are the courts the primary expositors
of the law as they were in the nineteenth century. Instead, they review
law made by others. 3 Federal courts have become part of a composite
lawmaking system, in which they function in conjunction with
legislatures and administrative decisionmakers so that the law is the
joint product of all three.
Similarly, the rise of a vast administrative bureaucracy with
lawmaking powers has transformed the role of Congress. For one
thing, it has stimulated the growth of congressional staff and ancillary
institutions, but even more importantly it has altered the nature of
federal legislation itself. Most significant legislation passed by
Congress today is not addressed to the citizenry, but to supposedly
expert administrative decisionmakers, who in turn formulate the level
of rules that touch the populace.
Justice White and the majority differ not only in how they conceive
of the changes in the structure of government since the New Deal, but
also in the jurisprudential significance that they ascribe to them. White
senses that "the most significant legal trend of the last century" must
somehow alter existing constitutional relationships. It is downright
: Ibid.
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silly, White maintains, to read the language of the Constitution
concerning the legislative process in isolation, without taking into
account massive changes that have taken place in other lawmaking
institutions. White gropes for a recognized legal doctrine that will
legitimize the idea that a change in institutions of a magnitude as
fundamental as the growth of the "modern administrative state" should
alter the meaning and relationships among existing provisions of the
Constitution. White never finds it, and perhaps no such doctrine now
exists in American constitutional law. The majority dismisses White's
point, characterizing it as a mere "utilitarian argument" that the
legislative veto is a "useful 'political invention'.""04 According to the
majority, the growth of the administrative state and the concomitant
need to control it are mere "policy arguments," which do not rise to
the level of constitutional significance.
Perhaps the majority's answer suffices for a case like Chadha, since
reasonable substitutes for the legislative veto are available. The
difference between White and the majority in Chadha is, however,
symptomatic of a deeper confusion in our law over the constitutional
status and significance of lawmaking by administrative bodies, a
confusion that could cause great harm if it is not resolved. Because
existing constitutional doctrines were made to accommodate three
branches of government, not four, it is the lawyer's equivalent of
child's play to raise questions about the "uneasy constitutional position
of the administrative agency,"2 or to yearn for the day when the courts
will invoke the nondelegation doctrine to return us to a simpler era in
which Congress made the laws, as the framers intended.' 6
Ultimately, what White is up against in Chadha is the problem
created by the growth of "quasi-constitutional" institutions. The
dimensions of the problem can be clarified by referring to an article
written several years ago by Kenneth Dam describing the "American
Fiscal Constitution.""0 ' Dam began by noting that "the notion of an
American Fiscal Constitution may strike most American constitution-
al lawyers as odd," since the Constitution itself has comparatively little
to say about financial matters."8 Adapting the concept of "framework
103 S. Ct. at 2781.
BREYER & STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 37-39 (1979).
See McGowan, note 8 supra, at 1128-30; but see Easterbrook, note 3 supra, at 118-19: "The
nondelegation doctrine is a name without a doctrine."
zo Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (1977).
Id. at 271.
[1983
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statutes" proposed originally by Gerhard Casper,2" Dam suggested that
the American Fiscal Constitution could be understood as extending
beyond the test of the Constitution itself:?"
Supplementing the rules of taxation and expenditure found in the
Constitution are several statutes that are so far-reaching in their
implications for year-by-year fiscal decisions that they deserve to be
thought of as quasi-constitutional.... American constitutional law
does not have a separate category to describe these "framework"
statutes, though they are increasing in importance. Although such
statutes can be amended under the same congressional majority rule
as any other statute and must comply with the Constitution, it
would be a triumph of form over substance to treat them as ordinary
legislation.
In addition to the "framework statutes" defining the budgetary
process, the American Fiscal Constitution includes certain customary
rules including the "widespread consensus in American society about
the respective roles of the federal, state and local governments. ''21
Taken together "this evolving structure is at least as important as the
provisions of the Constitution, and perhaps can be described as the
constitution (with a lower-case 'c') underlying the process of public
choice" in the fiscal area.212 Although never quite put into these words,
the central idea of a fiscal constitution is the insight that one core
function of a constitution- creating the basic institutions of
government and defining power relationships among them-is being
performed for fiscal matters in the United States by legal structures
that are not part of the Constitution."3
The United States has at least one other "constitution (with a
lower-case 'c')," which we might call the "constitution of the
administrative state." Its functions are to provide structure and control
over the enormous array of federal departments, independent
commissions, agencies, government corporations, banks, boards,
committees, and quasi-official agencies and authorities that now
Casper, note 81 supra, at 482.
" Dam, note 207 supra, at 272-73. Dam mentions the War Powers Resolution as an example
of another "framework" statute. Id. at 271 n.6.
2Id. at 273.
2 Id. at 273-74.
"' The German Constitution (Grundgesetz, or Basic Law) defines fiscal relationships in much
greater detail than in the United States, "giving fiscal federalism in the Federal Republic a
constitutional explicitness and structure almost totally lacking in the United States." Id. at
294.
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exercise power to make law in various forms."4 This network of legal
principles, usually thought of as part of administrative law, includes
"framework" statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act,' the
Freedom of Information Act,"' the Federal Advisory Committee
Act,217 the common law of judicial review of administrative action,
even Executive Orders21' and unwritten rules concerning informal
interagency consultation. Together the constitution of the administra-
tive state creates a system of law by which government instrumentali-
ties are supposedly controlled and managed.'
American lawyers do not yet have terms and concepts to enable
them comfortably to handle bodies of law of this sort.2" The word
"quasi-constitutional"22' has been suggested by some to describe such
law, ' but it is awkward. Moreover, it carries the unfortunate
implication that this law is not really of constitutional stature."2 ' The
truth is that quasi-constitutional law has some, but not all, of the
characteristics of constitutional law.
Quasi-constitutional law is unlike formally amending the text of the
Constitution. A lowercase constitution can be modified more easily as
conditions change, or, more to the point, as experiments with different
approaches for controlling administrative discretion are tried one after
another until one works.2 At the moment the law is in the midst of
a major exercise in revising the constitution of the administrative state.
At issue is how to extend the Constitution's system of checks and
balances to the array of lawmaking institutions exercising delegated
powers. Another generation of administrative lawyers, led by Louis
" Over 600 pages are required simply to catalog them, see THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982-83.
5 U.S.C. §551 et seq. (1976).
5 U.S.C. §552 (1976).
5 U.S.C. App. I (Supp. I, 1977).
See, e.g., Executive Order No. 12291, 46 FED. REG. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
See BREYER & STEWART, note 205 supra, at 10-11 (1979); DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT §1.01 at I (3d ed. 1972).
"o Elsewhere I have used the term "meta-law" to describe law of this kind, Elliott, Holmes and
Evolution, note 111 supra (1984); Elliott, The Disintegration of Administrative Law, 92 YALE L.
J. (1983) (forthcoming).
... Dam, note 207 supra, at 272.
... See Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial
Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713,
740 (1977); GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 429 (9th ed.
1975).
... Dam himself later abandons the term; see Dam, note 207 supra, at 278 (referring to
"framework" statutes as "part of the Fiscal Constitution in its larger sense").
"*' See BREYER, note 103 supra, at 3; see also Shapiro, On Predicting the Future of Administrative
Law, REGULATION 18 (May/June 1982).
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Jaffe, maintained that judicial review could control and coordinate
administrative actions.22 Many now see this role as too ambitious for
the courts and have begun to look elsewhere for new, or at least
supplementary, techniques for controlling administrative action.26
Some have argued that the President should be given broad powers
to supervise and control administrative lawmaking.22' This approach to
strengthening coordination and control within the Executive branch
received strong reinforcement recently with the enactment of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,228 which for the first time gives the
President, through OMB, veto power over virtually all new rules by
administrative entities.229
Others, however, dispute that control over administrative lawmak-
ing is an appropriate role for the President, arguing for enhancing
legislative control instead. They applaud the resurgence of Congress,
as reflected in enhanced oversight activity and the legislative veto,3' or
imagine that the nondelegation doctrine might be a way of forcing
Congress to take more responsibility."' Another faction takes the
position that the agencies should remain independent, insulated from
politics as much as possible.'' And finally, still others suggest
enhancing judicial control by creating new causes of action for the
beneficiaries of regulatory programs. " From this perspective of
continuing constitutional development, Chadha can be understood as
one episode in a struggle among the three established branches of
government to redefine their roles in the evolving "constitution of the
administrative state," with the Court having adopted its traditional
stance of joining with the Executive against the Congress."'
2' See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
See BREYER, note 103 supra, at 3; Elliott, note 220 supra.
... Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L. J. 1395 (1975); see also
Executive Order No. 12291, note 218 supra (giving the Office of Management and Budget broad
authority to review major proposed new rules).
... 44 U.S.C. §3501 et seq. (Supp. V, 1981).
See 44 U.S.C. §3508 (administrative entities may not promulgate new rules requiring
collection of any information from outside government unless Director of OMB concurs in the
"necessity" for the rules).
.. See SUNDQUIST, note 97 supra.
"' McGowan, note 8 supra; see also BOLTON, note 8 supra, at 49 (calling on Congress to enact
"more carefully structured" grants of discretion instead of the legislative veto).
... Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting argument by the
Environmental Defense Fund that interference in EPA rulemaking by Congress and White
House officials after close of record was improper); see also ACKERMAN & HASSLER, note 148
supra, at 116-28.
'" See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193
(1982).
'" See KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 83 (1978): the "combination of the
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A lowercase constitution facilitates both experimentation with
different approaches and adaptation to a changing environment to a
greater degree than would be possible by amending the text of the
Constitution. Using nonconstitutional sources of law to perform
essentially constitutional functions has worked reasonably well. But
the quasi-constitutional approach to institutional change depends for
its success on there being no strong sources of tension between the
rapidly evolving constitutional structure and the formal Constitution.
Thus, Dam suggests that the quasi-constitutional approach has worked
in the fiscal area, in part because the formal Constitution is
open-textured on fiscal matters: "The lacunae in the written
Constitution have been filled by Supreme Court interpretations and by
statutes, which can be changed when conditions change."2"'
Grave difficulties can arise, however, when basic changes in
institutional relationships are made without changing the text of the
Constitution. It is possible to use quasi-constitutional methods to walk
into the legal equivalent of a cul-de-sac: gradual, piecemeal
modifications of institutional relationships may be upheld as
constitutional (as broad delegations of legislative power have been),
but doctrines may be lacking that permit the meaning of other, related
parts of the formal constitutional structure to be altered if the new
institutional developments have "mere" statutory sources. This is
becoming an increasingly serious problem as the importance of
administrative lawmaking continues to grow; hence "the uneasy
constitutional position of the administrative agency. "236
The problem can be illustrated by imagining that there had been a
formal amendment to the Constitution establishing a Fourth Branch.
Lawyers do not have much difficulty conceiving that established
meanings change as a result of modifications that are embodied as
changes to the text of the Constitution (or Supreme Court
interpretations, which are another way of incorporating change into a
text). Amendments to one part of a text may change the meaning of
other provisions whose language remains the same; the new and old are
read together and a new whole is created. Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment changes the meaning of the First Amendment by revising
the relationship between federal and state governments.
executive branch and the judicial branch against the congressional branch ... is pervasive in our
constitutional history, except on rare occasions."
.. Dam, note 207 supra, at 274.
21 See note 205 supra.
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An amendment creating a Fourth Branch of government would also
have altered existing constitutional relationships. The amendment
might have made it clear that neither the Congress nor the President
was to have a veto over actions by administrative bodies. Indeed, if the
imaginary Fourth Branch amendment had been adopted in 1946, when
the Administrative Procedure Act was passed, it probably would have
embodied the then prevailing (and since discredited) theory that
judicial review alone would be adequate to control administrative
discretion. But leave the particular content of the Fourth Branch
amendment aside for the moment. The point is that inevitably an
amendment would have affected other portions of the structure and
relationships created by the Constitution;.. a coherent, new whole is
created each time a text is changed, either by amendment or judicial
interpretation.
Therein is the crux of Justice White's problem in Chadha: the "most
significant legal trend of the last century" was not accomplished by
amending the Constitution, but by developing a constitution of the
administrative state piecemeal. The problem cannot be solved now by
adopting an amendment to the Constitution codifying the results, even
if that were politically feasible. The process of quasi-constitutional
evolution is still proceeding too rapidly to be fixed in a formal
amendment to the Constitution, and it is questionable whether the
need for change and experimentation in this area will ever diminish to
the point at which an amendment to the Constitution would become
practical. The solution must be to find a way to interpret the
Constitution so that quasi-constitutional developments and the original
text can be harmonized.
C. CHADHA REVISITED
Justice White's argument in Cbadba goes astray once he concedes
that the "wisdom and the constitutionality of... broad delegations [to
administrative lawmakers] are matters that still have not been put to
rest.."238 On the contrary, it is hard to imagine any proposition of
constitutional law that is more firmly established de facto than that law
may be made by administrative institutions acting under broad
delegations. It would be fatuous to believe that the courts are actually
capable of declaring unconstitutional the vast administrative apparatus
.. See generally BLACK, note 184 supra.
"' 103 S. Ct. at 2802.
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that has developed during the fifty years since the New Deal, no matter
how suspect its foundations may be in terms of existing legal doctrines.
The administrative state exists. It is beyond the practical power of the
Supreme Court to make it go away or even to modify its essentials
significantly. Sooner or later constitutional doctrines will have to be
modified accordingly. When institutional reality refuses to accom-
modate itself to legal doctrine, eventually doctrine has to accommodate
itself to reality.
In principle, moreover, broad delegations of lawmaking authority to
administrative decisionmakers are not some accident or incidental
development that has come about through a combination of judicial
timidity and congressional laziness, although undoubtedly there are
particular statutes which are ill-advised or poorly drafted. The growth
of administrative lawmaking over the half-century since the New Deal
has been fueled by fundamental political and cultural currents"" that
the law is powerless to reverse and to which it must therefore
accommodate itself.
The existence of a sprawling administrative bureaucracy with broad
powers to make law should no longer be regarded as an open
constitutional question. It is constitutional fact. It must become one of
the fundamental premises from which our reasoning about constitu-
tional structure and relationships begins. In this sense, the rise of
administrative lawmaking, although accomplished gradually and
without benefit of a formal amendment to the Constitution, now
constitutes an amendment to the Constitution de facto. The changes in
structure and working relationships which are hinted at by the term
"the administrative state" are at least as fundamental as any of the
changes in governmental institutions that have been embodied in
constitutional amendments during the twentieth century.'4
It is a necessary first step to acknowledge that administrative
lawmaking under broad delegations is constitutional, but it is only a
first step. Next must come a recognition that the Constitution as a
whole changes not only when the text changes, but also when its
institutional context changes. No text draws meaning from its words
alone. Meaning is also determined by a context, which includes a
"9 See Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 YALE L. J. 702, 725 (1981); see also Elliott,
Antbropologizing Environmentalism, 92 YALE L. J. (1983) (forthcoming).
140 Cf. Amendment XVI (income tax); Amendment XVII (direct election of Senators);
Amendment XXII (President limited to two terms). It could be argued, however, that the federal
income tax is the change in the framers' design that has made possible the growth of the federal
government described in the text.
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structure of institutional relationships in which the text is embedded.
Imagine, for example, a constitution with words identical to ours, but
without the inferior federal courts. Although the words would be the
same, inevitably meanings would have diverged because of the
different institutional contexts in which the words would be set.2"'
Despite its obvious importance, institutional context did not often
present major problems for constitutional interpretation until this
century. The basic structure of government either was established in
the Constitution itself, or fundamental changes to it were ratified
through amendments or interpretations by the Supreme Court, and
thereby were incorporated into the text itself. But in the twentieth
century this tradition has eroded and we have come to rely more and
more on quasi-constitutional sources of law to create and shape the
institutional context on which the meaning of the Constitution
depends.
From a lawyer's perspective, the resulting problem is how the
meaning of our fundamental law, the Constitution, can be affected by
"mere" statutory sources of law such as the lowercase constitution of
the administrative state. One possible answer is through the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which Justice White mentions in Chadha but does
not exploit. 2 Part of the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution
was their recognition that they could not anticipate more than the most
rudimentary outlines of the government that would be necessary if the
enterprise they launched were to succeed. The text of the Constitution
does not purport to create all necessary institutions once and for all.
Instead, the Constitution gives Congress power to create such
institutions as shall be necessary and proper to carry into effect the
powers of government.23 The changes in the structure of government
encompassed under the rubric "the administrative state" were,
ultimately, created through Congress's exercise of its powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. As such, these institutions are as much
a part of the structure and relationships established by the Constitution
as if they were created in the text itself.
This is not to say that the legislative veto is constitutional. But it is
to say that the majority in Chadha was wrong-dead wrong-to
dismiss Justice White's arguments about the rise of the administrative
"' See also SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 169-81 (1983).
... 103 S. Ct. at 2801 (White J., dissenting).
" See First National Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416, 419 (1917).
In his Storrs Lectures, delivered after the present article was in press, Professor Bruce
Ackerman develops several parallel ideas. See Ackerman, "Discovering the Constitution"
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state as mere points of policy irrelevant to the constitutional question.
Administrative lawmaking is now a central part of the Constitution.
The task for the Court should have been to reinterpret the
Constitution to create a harmonious new whole, just as that would have
been the Court's task if a Fourth Branch had been created by
constitutional amendment.
The legislative veto at issue in Chadha is unconstitutional, not
because the words of Article I read in splendid, sterile isolation
prohibit all legislative vetoes, but because this particular legislative veto
is inconsistent with the Constitution, the administrative state included.
The legislative veto at issue in Chadha is not unconstitutional because
it is an attempt by Congress to exercise legislative power without
following the proper procedures for legislation, as the Court held, but
because it is an attempt by Congress to exercise powers that can no
longer properly be considered legislative. Whatever role the framers
may have intended for private bills in immigration cases originally,
today it has become an administrative function to say whether an
individual case involves "extreme hardship." Thus, the legislative veto
is inconsistent with the scheme of the Immigration and Nationality
Act as a whole, and with our evolving notions of what constitutes a
proper legislative function. In the context of suspensions of
deportation for individual aliens, the legislative veto therefore violates
what John Marshall called the "spirit of the Constitution," and what
today we might call due process, or the deep structure of the
Constitution's evolving grammar.
The Court decided Chadha too broadly and on the wrong grounds.
In the end, however, those are not the reasons why the case is so
troubling. What is haunting about Chadha is the revelation that the
Supreme Court has not yet developed a theory to harmonize
administrative lawmaking and the Constitution. If need be, the law
will survive the loss of the legislative veto. There will be real trouble,
however, if the Court has forgotten that there is more to the
Constitution than just words.
(Lectures delivered at the Yale Law School, November 8-10, 1983). Ackerman also portrays the
New Deal as bringing about fundamental changes which are tantamount to amending the
Constitution. According to Ackerman's theory, however, the legitimacy of these changes
depends largely upon the "critical election" of 1936. The present article, on the other hand,
conceives of a de facto amendment to the Constitution as coming about through a gradual process
of related developments and community acceptance, like the common law.
